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From Provinces into Nations: Demographic Integration in Western Europe, 
1870-1960. By Susan Cotts Watkins. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. Pp. xvii + 235. $42.50. 
Studies of fertility transition are among the most familiar contributions of historical 
demography. Indeed, modernity has come to be defined, in part, by substantial re- 
duction in the number of children born to populations of adult women. Lots of effort 
has gone into dating the transition and accounting for variations in its onset and pace. 
For the most part, however, the explanatory model has remained relatively stable: 
(1) industrialization and related socioeconomic changes altered the cost-benefit calculus 
by which individuals and couples decided whether and when to have children, and when 
to stop having them, and (2) availability of progressively better birth control technology 
enabled people to exercise their freedom of choice more efficaciously. There are debates 
about the relative importance of each major factor, but there has been surprisingly little 
debate about the underlying assumption that some manner of rational individual cal- 
culation is the basic causal factor. Individualistic rational choice theory is the implicit 
guide to most demographic analysis. 
Recently, a number of demographers have begun to complement attention to 
individual calculation with examination of broader social and cultural factors. From 
Provinces into Nations is among the more interesting of these efforts. In it, 
Susan Cotts Watkins starts from the observation that there was not only higher fertility 
in nineteenth-century Europe than a hundred years later but much greater variation in 
fertility rates. Localities, regions, and countries all varied more in the number of live 
births per woman in 1870 than in 1960. As Watkins's title implies, the production of 
uniformity was greatest within national boundaries. 
Watkins's argument consists of two main parts. The first and most convincing is her 
demonstration of progressive uniformity of demographic behavior. She looks not only 
at fertility but also at tendency to marry and at legitimacy of children. All three sets 
of rates become more consistent throughout Europe, but substantially more so within 
national boundaries. Watkins supplements her general statistics with specific exami- 
nations of border provinces (e.g., the Basque country in both France and Spain), 
which clearly show increasing homogeneity within nation-state borders and decreasing 
homogeneity within the transborder egion or ethnicity. The main weakness to this part 
of Watkins's account is a willingness to accept rather ad hoc explanations of exceptions 
to the overall pattern. In Italy, for example, demographic diversity increased during the 
fertility transition (even while other diversities, like those of language, decreased). 
Watkins basically suggests that the "earlier demographic homogeneity may be 
deceptive" (p. 44). Despite this concern, it seems clear that Watkins has identified a 
significant trend toward demographic uniformity as part of the fertility transition. 
The second part of Watkins's argument is her effort to show that the growing 
uniformity was not produced simply by similar structural patterns determining 
individual interests throughout countries. A central part of Watkins's agenda is to show 
that individualistic cost-benefit calculations are not an adequate way to understand 
fertility rates. Though she is not very explicit about this, she is in fact joining in a 
general argument for the importance of culture to rational choice explanations. The 
gist of her position is that through social communication people learn norms about the 
"appropriate" number of children to have, how close together they should come, how 
important it is for them to be legitimate, and a host of other matters. In short, these 
seemingly "private" decisions are shaped by broader culture. This seems undoubtedly 
true to me, but unfortunately it is not altogether demonstrated in the book. For the most 
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part, Watkins relies on correlations between demographic changes and processes of 
market integration, linguistic standardization (her measure of "nation-building"), and 
expansion of state functions. These are generally consistent with Watkins's argument 
but not conclusive. Thus market integration and state expansion could be held to affect 
demographic behavior mainly through giving people similar interests on which to base 
their individual calculations. Only the correlations between declining linguistic 
diversity and more uniform demographic behavior clearly support Watkins's argument 
more than the conventional rational choice one. 
Watkins has a compelling idea, but she does not develop any very detailed empirical 
arguments as to the causal links between broader cultural, political, and economic 
factors and demographic trends. She relies "more on logical extrapolations from 
consistent findings than on the direct analysis" of links between these factors and 
demographic change (p. 176). Watkins's main model for a link between culture or 
social groups and individual demographic decision making is community gossip. It 
seems clear that women gathering in small groups exert social control by criticizing 
deviant behavior and describing preferred behaviors. This, Watkins suggests, was a 
major factor in determining premodern demographic behavior. Where other demog- 
raphers see a shift from such social control to individual freedom (aided by better birth 
control techniques), Watkins sees a shift from "social control by a smaller group to 
social control by a larger group" (p. 178). Watkins's evidence against the notion of 
pure individual choice (not really a very plausible idea in the first place) is much 
stronger than her evidence for any particular form of "social control by a larger 
group." Thus the very fact of increasing uniformity in demographic behavior strongly 
suggests that some supraindividual factors are at work (though as noted, these might 
be working by structuring circumstances and interests rather than thought patterns). 
But is social control a good model for these larger forces? 
Watkins seems to be thinking of cultural diffusion in modern societies as a matter 
of village gossip writ large and carried out through newspapers. She writes repeatedly 
of the economic, political, and linguistic integration she describes as producing 
"larger communities" with more people who are recognized as "like us." The 
similarity should enable both the spread of information and the exercise of social 
control. I suspect, however, that the processes at work in large states (and interna- 
tionally) are poorly described as simply the expansion of community. Certainly the 
promulgation of images of appropriate family size does take place: one could look at 
everything from novels to women's magazines to pictures in advertisements and 
newspaper advice columns. But are these social control in the same sense as gossip 
among a tightly knit group of neighbors? To be brief, Watkins needs a more developed 
theory of culture and of large-scale social relations. She needs to describe, for 
example, how people one does not know (like film stars) and who may not exist (like 
characters in novels and TV shows) may take on crucial significance as reference 
groups, and how these abstract and/or distant reference groups relate to discourse (and 
social control) among those one knows well. 
Lacking a strong account of how large-scale cultural and social change influences 
demographic behavior, Watkins's book is perhaps most interesting for its introduction 
of demographic uniformity as an index of the growing salience of nation-states in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is also valuable, however, for its 
suggestion of a kind of research historical demographers (and simply historians 
prepared to take demography seriously) might do if they would refocus their attention 
away from purely individualistic decision-making models and the pursuit of technical 
refinements. That this will not be easy is suggested indirectly by Watkins's own style. 
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She writes at length on details of her methodology and answers all sorts of possible 
criticisms of her main finding of progressive demographic uniformity (this part of the 
book is written like a very long journal article). This seems to be the quarter from 
which she fears professional criticism. But when she turns to developing an account of 
cultural and social life that could specify the sources of changing demographic 
behavior she is content to be very general and to settle for rather thin descriptions of 
actual relationships and behavior. Watkins shares this fault with most contemporary 
fertility research, but she deserves credit for trying to break out of its narrow range of 
problems and approaches. 
CRAIG CALHOUN 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
The Long Argument: English Puritanism and the Shaping of New England 
Culture, 1570-1700. By Stephen Foster. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Pp. xx + 395. $39.95. 
Historians have devoted much time and energy to defining "Puritanism," to revealing 
its inner essence, whether in theological or social terms. Stephen Foster thinks the 
whole quest has been mistaken and ahistorical. The word "Puritan" defines "a loose 
and incomplete alliance of progressive Protestants, lay and clerical, aristocratic and 
humble, who were never quite sure whether they were the vanguard or the remnant." 
This movement "altered its tactics and its emphases as its fortunes varied over time, 
and . . . was never homogeneous at any single period" (pp. 4-5). 
Before 1629 Puritans hoped to work through parliamentary politics, "tarrying for 
the magistrate." But Puritans never dominated the House of Commons: "Puritan 
politics was for much of the period a tale of reduced expectations, lesser goods traded 
for greater, and alliances built on lowest common denominators" (p. 118). Politics 
was the art of the possible. After 1629, the end of Parliaments, Laud made 
accommodation increasingly impossible. God seemed to be leaving England. Many of 
the godly emigrated. Even Winthrop warned of "a social war in England as bitter and 
as violent as the Peasants' War had been in Germany" (p. 111). He was not alone. 
Puritans reacted differently in old and New England. New England Congregation- 
alism was what we call "Presbyterianism" in the reign of Elizabeth. In old England 
conservative Puritans after 1640 recognized the danger of too much congregational 
democracy: we call them "Presbyterians." English radical Puritans moved to a 
congregationalism prepared to tolerate sectaries, very different from that of New 
England (pp. 53-54, 61). After 1640 New England was no longer just a refuge and 
hiding place for the godly: they controlled the church-state alliance of clergy, gentry, 
and propertied laity. This alliance survived in England from Elizabeth's reign until 
1640 and continued for a century longer in New England (p. 288). But the magistracy 
there was weaker than in old England, more dependent on the clergy, less anticlerical. 
Magistracy and clergy united to curb the potentially explosive democratic element 
drawn-Foster thinks-from later refugees from Laudianism (pp. 138-39). 
Escape from the ecclesiastical hierarchy led Puritanism in New England to diverge 
widely from that which had been left behind. The original saints had been clearly 
visible, under persecution, in exile in the Netherlands, among the original settlers of 
New England. Later immigrants had to pass the test of the conversion narrative to 
establish their sanctity. Presbyterians in England wanted to preserve a comprehensive 
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